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Chapter 3 Ruling The Countryside
After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the Mughal Empire's authority weakened. Regional powers asserted control, but by the second half of the 18th century, the British emerged as a new dominant force. Originally a trading entity, the British East India Company gradually acquired political power and territory, particularly after securing the **Diwani** of Bengal.
Fig. 1 depicts Robert Clive receiving the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa from the Mughal Emperor in 1765. While the actual event was likely a simpler affair in Clive's tent with few witnesses, this painting, commissioned by Clive, portrays it as a grand, formal occasion in a majestic setting. This artistic interpretation highlights the immense importance the British attributed to the acquisition of Diwani.
Revenue For The Company
The grant of **Diwani** on 12 August 1765 made the East India Company the chief financial administrator of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. This gave them control over the vast **revenue resources** of these territories. Although now the administrator, the Company still viewed itself primarily as a trading entity.
Their immediate goal was to maximise revenue collection to fund their growing expenses, particularly for purchasing goods for export. They initially lacked a regular system for assessing and collecting revenue, simply aiming to increase collections as much as possible while buying Indian goods, especially fine cotton and silk, at the lowest possible prices.
Within five years of acquiring the Diwani, the volume of goods the Company purchased in Bengal doubled. Crucially, before 1765, the Company had to import **gold and silver** from Britain to buy goods in India. Now, the **revenue collected in Bengal** could be used to finance these purchases, ending the drain of bullion from Britain.
However, this aggressive revenue extraction and cheap procurement policy had a devastating impact on the Bengal economy. Artisans were forced to sell their products to the Company at unfairly low prices, causing them to abandon their villages. Peasants found it impossible to pay the high revenue demands.
Artisanal production declined significantly, and agricultural cultivation showed signs of collapse. This economic distress culminated in a horrific **famine in 1770**, which tragically killed an estimated ten million people in Bengal, wiping out about one-third of the population.
Fig. 2 depicts a weekly market or 'haat' in Murshidabad, Bengal. These markets were vital centres where rural peasants and artisans traded goods. During times of economic hardship caused by excessive revenue demands and unfair trade practices, these traditional markets were severely affected, reflecting the widespread distress in the countryside.
The Need To Improve Agriculture
Witnessing the ruin of the Bengal economy raised concerns within the Company. They realised that a collapsing agricultural sector would eventually jeopardise their own revenue income. Many officials became convinced that it was necessary to **encourage investment in land** and **improve agricultural productivity** to ensure a stable and increasing revenue flow.
After lengthy discussions lasting two decades, the Company introduced the **Permanent Settlement in 1793**. This system aimed to address the issue of revenue collection and encourage agricultural improvement.
Key features of the Permanent Settlement:
- The **rajas and taluqdars** were recognised as **zamindars**.
- Zamindars were given the responsibility of **collecting rent from the peasants**.
- Zamindars were required to **pay a fixed amount of revenue to the Company**.
- The amount of revenue to be paid to the Company was **fixed permanently**; it would not be increased in the future.
The intention behind fixing the revenue permanently was two-fold:
- To ensure a **regular and predictable flow of revenue** into the Company's treasury.
- To motivate the zamindars to **invest in improving the land**. It was reasoned that since the state's revenue demand would remain constant, any increase in production due to improvements would directly benefit the zamindar, thus incentivising them to invest.
Fig. 3 shows Charles Cornwallis, who was the Governor-General of Bengal when the Permanent Settlement was implemented in 1793. His administration was responsible for introducing this major land revenue system that significantly shaped the relationship between the British, the zamindars, and the peasants in Bengal.
The Problem
Despite its intentions, the Permanent Settlement quickly encountered problems and did not achieve its desired outcomes.
Initial issues:
- Company officials soon discovered that many zamindars were **not investing in land improvement**.
- The fixed revenue demand was set **very high**, making it difficult for many zamindars to make the payments.
- Those zamindars who **failed to pay the revenue lost their zamindaris**, which were then auctioned off by the Company. Numerous zamindaris changed hands in the early years of the settlement.
Later developments (by the early 19th century):
- Market prices rose, and agricultural cultivation slowly expanded, leading to an **increase in the income of the surviving zamindars**.
- However, since the revenue payable to the Company was **permanently fixed**, the Company did not benefit from this increased income.
- Many zamindars still lacked interest in improving the land. Some had lost heavily early on, while others realised they could earn simply by renting out land to tenants and collecting rent (**ryots** and **under-tenants**) without the effort or risk of investment. Their focus was on collecting rent, not on agricultural development.
Impact on Cultivators (Ryots):
- The system was extremely **oppressive** for the cultivators.
- The **rent demanded by the zamindar was excessively high**.
- Peasants' rights over the land they cultivated for generations were **insecure**.
- To pay the rent, peasants often had to take **loans from moneylenders**.
- Failure to pay the rent resulted in **eviction** from their land.
Source 1, a description by H. T. Colebrook in 1806, highlights the plight of under-tenants in Bengal. Powerful ryots, who received land from zamindars, sublet it to under-tenants, demanding very high rents, often in kind, and charging exorbitant interest on loans for cattle, seed, and subsistence. This trapped under-tenants in a cycle of debt and poverty, leaving them with little hope and unable to labour effectively due to their abject conditions. Colebrook's concern likely stemmed from an awareness of the social injustice and potential instability caused by this extreme exploitation at the lowest level of the agrarian system, contrasting with the British ideal of promoting prosperity.
A New System Is Devised
Given the problems with the Permanent Settlement, many Company officials felt by the early 19th century that the revenue system needed to be revised. The fixed revenue meant the Company couldn't increase its income even as its administrative and trade expenses grew.
In the **North Western Provinces** of the Bengal Presidency (areas now largely in Uttar Pradesh), a new system was developed by **Holt Mackenzie**, which was implemented in **1822**. Mackenzie believed that the **village (mahal)** was a crucial social unit in North India and should be preserved.
Under this system, collectors were tasked with visiting villages to:
- Inspect the land.
- Measure fields individually.
- Record the local customs and rights of different groups within the village.
The estimated revenue for each plot within a village was calculated and then aggregated to determine the total revenue demand that each **mahal** (village or group of villages) had to pay. Unlike the Permanent Settlement, this revenue demand was **not fixed permanently** but was subject to **periodic revision**.
The responsibility for collecting the revenue from the Mahal and paying it to the Company was given to the **village headman**, rather than a designated zamindar. This system became known as the **Mahalwari Settlement**.
The Munro System
In the British territories in **South India**, the idea of a Permanent Settlement was also abandoned. A different new system was devised, known as the **Ryotwari** or **Ryotwar** system.
This system was initially experimented with on a smaller scale by **Captain Alexander Read** in some areas acquired by the Company after their wars with Tipu Sultan. It was later further developed by **Thomas Munro** and progressively extended throughout South India.
Read and Munro believed that there were no traditional intermediaries like zamindars in South India in the same way as in Bengal. Therefore, they argued that the revenue settlement should be made directly with the **cultivators** themselves, referred to as **ryots**, who had been farming the land for generations.
Under this system, each ryot's field was meticulously **surveyed and measured separately** before their individual revenue assessment was determined. Munro advocated for the British to adopt a **paternalistic role**, acting like father figures responsible for protecting the ryots under their care.
Fig. 4 is a portrait of Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras from 1819 to 1826. He was instrumental in developing and implementing the Ryotwari system in South India, advocating for direct revenue settlement with the cultivators based on individual field surveys.
All Was Not Well
Despite the changes introduced by the Mahalwari and Ryotwari systems, it soon became evident that these new arrangements were also facing significant problems within a few years of their implementation.
Motivated by the continuous pressure to increase revenue income, the Company's revenue officials often fixed the revenue demands **too high** under these new systems as well.
The excessive revenue demands made it **difficult or impossible for the peasants (ryots) to pay**. This led to widespread distress.
As a result, many ryots **fled the countryside**, abandoning their lands. In many regions, villages became **deserted** as cultivators migrated elsewhere in search of better conditions.
The optimistic vision of Company officials, who had hoped that the new systems would transform peasants into prosperous, entrepreneurial farmers, **failed to materialise**. Instead, the high demands led to hardship and depopulation in rural areas.
Crops For Europe
Beyond merely collecting revenue, the British realised that the Indian countryside possessed the potential to produce crops that were in high demand in Europe. This led to efforts to expand the cultivation of specific commercial crops.
From the late 18th century onwards, the Company actively promoted the cultivation of crops like **opium and indigo**. Over the next century and a half, the British used persuasion and coercion to encourage or force cultivators in different parts of India to grow various other crops required by Europe:
- **Jute** in Bengal
- **Tea** in Assam
- **Sugarcane** in the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh)
- **Wheat** in Punjab
- **Cotton** in Maharashtra and Punjab
- **Rice** in Madras
The British employed various methods to achieve this expansion of desired crop cultivation. The case of **indigo** provides a detailed example of how this was done and its consequences.
Figs. 5 and 6 display two different cotton prints. Fig. 5 is a **kalamkari print** from Andhra Pradesh, India (20th century), and Fig. 6 is a floral cotton print designed by **William Morris** in late 19th century England. A common feature is the prominent use of a rich **blue colour**, known as **indigo**. This blue dye was produced from the **indigo plant**. The dye used in British prints like Morris's was likely manufactured from indigo grown in India, as India was the world's leading supplier of indigo at that time.
Fig. 5 is a 20th-century Kalamkari print from Andhra Pradesh. Kalamkari is a type of hand-painted or block-printed cotton textile, traditionally using natural dyes. The presence of the distinctive blue colour in this print is indicative of the use of indigo, a dye with a long history of production and use in India.
Fig. 6 is a cotton print by the influential English artist and designer William Morris from the late 19th century. The use of a rich blue colour in such designs popular in Britain demonstrates the significant demand for blue dyes. This demand was a major driver for the expansion of indigo cultivation, particularly in India, which became a key supplier to British textile industries.
Why the Demand for Indian Indigo?
The indigo plant is native to **tropical regions**. As early as the 13th century, Indian indigo was imported into Europe for use by cloth manufacturers in Italy, France, and Britain as a dye.
Initially, the amount of Indian indigo reaching Europe was small, and its **price was very high**. European manufacturers largely relied on a plant called **woad** to produce violet and blue dyes. Woad grows in temperate zones and was more readily available in Europe (northern Italy, southern France, parts of Germany and Britain).
**Woad producers** in Europe saw indigo as a competitive threat and lobbied their governments to **ban indigo imports**.
However, **cloth dyers preferred indigo** because it produced a much **richer, vibrant blue** compared to the pale and dull colour from woad. By the 17th century, European cloth producers successfully persuaded their governments to lift or relax the ban on indigo.
European powers began establishing **indigo plantations** in their colonies in tropical regions:
- French: St Domingue (Caribbean)
- Portuguese: Brazil
- English: Jamaica
- Spanish: Venezuela
- Also in parts of North America.
By the late 18th century, the demand for indigo in Europe **increased significantly**. This was driven by the rapid expansion of **cotton production in Britain** due to industrialisation, which created a huge demand for cloth dyes. Simultaneously, existing indigo supplies from the West Indies and America declined sharply due to various reasons (like the slave revolt in St Domingue in 1791, see Fig. 7). Between 1783 and 1789, world indigo production halved. British dyers desperately needed new sources of indigo.
Fig. 7 shows a painting depicting the Slave Revolt in St Domingue in 1791. This revolt by African slaves working on French sugar and indigo plantations led to the destruction of plantations and the abolition of slavery in French colonies in 1792. This event severely disrupted indigo supplies from the Caribbean, increasing Europe's reliance on other sources, particularly India.
Britain Turns to India
Facing soaring demand and collapsing supplies elsewhere, Britain looked to **India** as the primary source for indigo. The East India Company in India actively sought to expand the area under indigo cultivation to meet this European demand.
Indigo cultivation in **Bengal** saw a rapid expansion from the late 18th century and quickly came to dominate the world market. In 1788, Indian indigo accounted for only about 30% of Britain's imports; by 1810, this figure had risen to a staggering **95%**.
As the indigo trade became increasingly profitable, British commercial agents and Company officials started **investing heavily** in indigo production. Many Company officials even resigned their jobs to become indigo planters. The prospect of high profits attracted numerous Scotsmen and Englishmen to India to become planters. Those lacking capital could obtain **loans** from the Company and newly established banks to finance their indigo businesses.
How Was Indigo Cultivated?
There were two primary systems of indigo cultivation under British planters in India: **nij** and **ryoti**.
The Problem With Nij Cultivation
Under the **nij** system, the planter cultivated indigo on land that he **directly owned or controlled**. He would either purchase the land or rent it from zamindars and hire labourers to cultivate indigo directly.
However, planters faced significant difficulties in expanding the area under nij cultivation:
- **Limited Availability of Fertile Land:** Indigo cultivation required highly fertile land, which was already densely populated and used for growing essential food crops like rice. Large, contiguous blocks of fertile land needed for plantation-scale cultivation were hard to acquire. Planters tried to lease land around their factories and evict existing peasants, leading to conflicts.
- **Labour Shortage:** Large-scale nij cultivation demanded a significant workforce. Labour was most needed during the peak indigo season, which unfortunately coincided with the time when peasants were busy cultivating their rice crops, making it difficult to find available labourers.
- **Requirement for Ploughs and Bullocks:** Nij cultivation on a large scale required a large number of ploughs and bullocks. For example, cultivating 1,000 bighas of land (a unit of land measurement, roughly one-third of an acre in Bengal) required 2,000 ploughs. Investing in purchasing and maintaining this many ploughs and bullocks was costly. Furthermore, obtaining these resources from peasants was difficult during the indigo season, as their own ploughs and bullocks were needed for rice cultivation.
Due to these challenges, planters were reluctant to significantly expand the area under nij cultivation. By the late 19th century, less than 25% of the land used for indigo production was under the nij system. The majority (over 75%) was cultivated under the **ryoti system**.
Indigo On The Land Of Ryots
Under the **ryoti** system, indigo was cultivated on the land of the **ryots (cultivators)**. The planters used various means to force ryots into growing indigo.
The process involved:
- Planters compelled ryots to sign a **contract** or agreement (**satta**). Sometimes, they pressurised village headmen to sign the contract on behalf of the ryots.
- Those who signed the contract received **cash advances** from the planters at low interest rates to encourage them to produce indigo.
- The loan, however, obligated the ryot to cultivate indigo on at least **25% of the area of their landholding**.
- The planter provided the **seed and a drilling tool**, while the ryot was responsible for **preparing the soil, sowing the seed, and tending the crop**.
After the harvest, when the crop was delivered to the planter, the ryot received the price for the indigo. However, a **new loan** was immediately issued, and the cycle of cultivation and debt continued.
While the cash advances might have seemed tempting initially, peasants soon realised the **harshness of the system**. The **price paid for the indigo crop was very low**, making it difficult to repay the loan and escape the debt cycle, which essentially never ended.
Furthermore, there were significant practical problems for the ryots:
- Planters insisted that indigo be grown on the **best and most fertile soils**. These were the same lands where peasants preferred to cultivate **rice**, their staple food crop.
- Indigo cultivation was detrimental to the soil. The plant had **deep roots** and **exhausted the soil rapidly**. After an indigo harvest, the land was often unsuitable for sowing rice, further impacting the ryot's ability to grow food for themselves.
Fig. 8 depicts workers harvesting indigo plants in early 19th century Bengal. The image shows the plant being cut. The text notes that in India, this task was primarily carried out by men.
Fig. 9 shows indigo plants being transported from the fields to the factory. This image illustrates the logistical link between the agricultural areas where indigo was grown (either Nij or Ryoti land) and the industrial facility where the dye was processed.
How Was Indigo Produced?
After the indigo plants were harvested, they were processed in indigo factories, typically located near the cultivation fields. The manufacturing process involved several steps using large vessels called **vats**.
The process generally involved three or four vats with distinct functions:
Step 1: Soaking in the Fermenting Vat
- Leaves were stripped from the indigo plant.
- These leaves were soaked in warm water in the **fermenting vat** (or steeper vat) for several hours.
- The plants fermented, causing the liquid to boil and bubble.
Step 2: Beating in the Beater Vat
- The rotten leaves were removed from the first vat.
- The liquid was drained into a second vat, positioned below the first, known as the **beater vat**.
- Workers continuously stirred and beat the solution using paddles in this vat (see Fig. 12).
- As the liquid was beaten, it gradually changed colour from green to blue.
- Lime water was added to the mixture.
Step 3: Settling and Processing in the Settling Vat
- The addition of lime caused the indigo to separate out in flakes.
- A muddy sediment (the indigo pulp) settled at the bottom of the vat, with clear liquid rising to the surface.
- The clear liquid was drained off.
- The sediment (indigo pulp) was transferred to a third vat (the **settling vat**).
- The pulp was then pressed and dried to form blocks of indigo, ready for sale (see Fig. 13).
Fig. 10 shows an indigo factory situated among fields, painted by William Simpson in 1863. The painting illustrates the industrial aspect of indigo production, with different vats visible, highlighting the multi-stage process involved in converting the plant into dye.
Fig. 11 depicts women carrying harvested indigo plants to the vats within the factory complex. This indicates the division of labour, where transporting the bulky plants was often done by women.
Fig. 12 shows a worker, termed a "Vat-Beater," standing waist-deep in a vat and stirring the indigo solution with a paddle. This strenuous and potentially unhealthy task required workers to spend long hours immersed in the processing liquid.
Fig. 13 illustrates the final stages of indigo production. Workers are shown stamping and cutting the processed indigo pulp which has been moulded. In the background, other workers carry away the finished blocks for drying, preparing them for export and sale.
The “Blue Rebellion” And After
The oppressive nature of the ryoti system, the low prices paid for indigo, the perpetual cycle of debt, and the forced cultivation on best lands led to widespread discontent among the indigo cultivators in Bengal.
In March 1859, this discontent erupted into a major uprising known as the **"Blue Rebellion"**. Thousands of ryots in Bengal **refused to grow indigo**. The rebellion spread rapidly, with ryots refusing to pay rent to the planters and attacking indigo factories with whatever weapons they could find, including swords, spears, bows, and arrows. Even women participated, fighting with household tools.
Those who worked for the planters faced social boycott. The **gomasthas** (agents of the planters responsible for collecting rent) were often physically assaulted and beaten. The ryots publicly declared that they would neither accept cash advances to sow indigo nor tolerate intimidation by the planters' armed strongmen, the **lathiyals**.
The indigo system was clearly intensely oppressive, but resistance is not automatic. The ryots' decision to rebel in 1859 was emboldened by a sense of having **support**. They believed they had the backing of **local zamindars and village headmen**.
Many village headmen, who had themselves been coerced into signing indigo contracts, actively mobilised the peasants and led confrontations against the lathiyals. Some zamindars also encouraged the ryots to resist the planters, partly due to their own resentment of the planters' increasing power and their anger at being forced to lease land to them on unfavourable long terms.
The indigo peasants also harboured a crucial belief that the **British government** would support them against the planters. This hope was partly fuelled by the aftermath of the **Revolt of 1857**, which had made the British government anxious about the possibility of another large-scale popular uprising.
When news of the simmering indigo revolt reached the government, the Lieutenant Governor toured the indigo districts in the winter of 1859. The ryots interpreted his visit as a sign of the government's sympathy for their plight. In Barasat, the magistrate **Ashley Eden** issued a notice stating that ryots would not be forced to accept indigo contracts. While Eden's intention was likely to calm the situation, his action was widely perceived by the ryots as an official endorsement of their rebellion, spreading the rumour that even Queen Victoria had forbidden compulsory indigo cultivation.
As the rebellion gained momentum, intellectuals from Calcutta travelled to the indigo areas. They documented the suffering of the ryots, the brutality of the planters, and the harsh realities of the indigo system, publishing reports and articles that drew public attention.
Alarmed by the rebellion, the government took action. They deployed the military to protect the planters and, importantly, set up the **Indigo Commission** to investigate the system of indigo production. The Commission's findings were critical of the planters; they were found guilty of using coercive and oppressive methods against the cultivators. The Commission concluded that indigo production was **not profitable for the ryots**.
The Commission instructed the ryots to fulfil their existing contracts but explicitly told them they were **free to refuse to produce indigo in the future**. This decision marked a turning point.
Source 3 provides an excerpt from the testimony of Hadji Mulla, an indigo cultivator, before the Indigo Commission on 5 June 1860. His emphatic statement, "I am not willing to sow, and I don’t know that any fresh terms would satisfy me," and "rather than sow indigo I will go to another country; I would rather beg than sow indigo," powerfully illustrates the deep-seated misery and absolute refusal of the ryots to continue indigo cultivation under any terms, highlighting the extreme oppression they faced.
Following the "Blue Rebellion" and the Indigo Commission's report, indigo production in Bengal **collapsed**. The planters subsequently shifted their operations to **Bihar**.
However, the indigo industry faced another blow in the late 19th century with the development of **synthetic dyes** in Europe. This severely impacted the demand for natural indigo, though planters in Bihar managed to continue production for a while.
The struggle against forced indigo cultivation in Bihar continued. When **Mahatma Gandhi** returned to India from South Africa, a peasant from Bihar persuaded him to visit **Champaran** to witness the plight of the indigo cultivators there. Mahatma Gandhi's visit and intervention in **1917** marked the beginning of the **Champaran movement**, a significant struggle against the indigo planters in that region.